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INTRODUCTION

“As Maine goes, so goes the nation.” Such was the nineteenth-century
truism that referenced Maine’s status as a presidential bellwether, a title the state
earned first by electing a Whig governor before the election of William Henry
Harrison—the first Whig president—in 1840,1 and later by having accurately
“predicted” the results of 18 of 26 presidential contests2 through the outcomes of
its September gubernatorial elections from 1832 to 1932.3 While Maine’s

1
‘As Maine Goes. . .’ Coined in 1840 Race, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 1958),
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1958/09/07/91405659.pdf.
2
See Historical Election Results: Electoral College Box Scores 1789–1996, NAT’L ARCHIVES
& RECS. ADMIN., https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/scores.html (last
visited Oct. 17, 2019). The victorious parties in the presidential elections of 1832, 1836, 1840,
1844, 1860, 1864, 1868, 1872, 1876, 1888, 1896, 1900, 1904, 1908, 1920, 1924, 1928, and 1932
also won the Maine gubernatorial elections held in those same years. See infra note 3.
3
See Former Maine Governors, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, https://www.nga.org/formergovernors/maine/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2019). Note that Maine elected its governors to one-year
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predictive reputation may have fallen by the wayside,4 its innovations in election
law might win it the attention—and, as this Note will argue, the imitation—of
other states.5
In November 2016, voters in Maine approved Question 5, a referendum
establishing a system of ranked-choice voting (“RCV”) for congressional,
gubernatorial, and legislative elections.6 RCV is a system for conducting
elections that ensures that the winning candidate will receive a majority of
support from the electorate, disallowing the possibility of a plurality victor.7 It
works by asking voters to rank the candidates on the ballot according to their
preference instead of asking voters to choose only one candidate among many.
The votes are tallied, and if one candidate wins a majority—50% plus one—of
first-preference votes, that candidate wins the election. If nobody has a majority,
all of the first-preference votes for the least popular candidate are redistributed
to those voters’ second-preference selections. If one candidate then has a
majority, that candidate wins; if not, the process repeats itself until a winner is
determined.8
The election and re-election of Paul LePage, a Republican politician
regarded as being both significantly more conservative than the median Maine
voter and a lightning rod for gaffe-related controversy,9 precipitated the
campaign to alter the way Maine voted.10 LePage was elected governor in 2010
in a contest between four candidates, including two independents. LePage won
just 38% of the vote, but it was enough to win an election in which the

terms in the relevant period until switching to two-year terms in the 1880 election, with the victors
taking office the following January.
4
See Edward R. Tufte & Richard A. Sun, Are There Bellwether Electoral Districts?, 39 PUB.
OPINION Q. 1, 1 (1975).
5
See generally L. Sandy Maisel, Ranked Choice Voting: “As Maine Goes. . .”, AM. INT.
(Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/08/07/ranked-choice-voting-asmaine-goes/.
6

Maine Question 5—Allow Ranked-Choice Voting—Results: Approved, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1,
2017, 11:25 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/maine-ballot-measure-5allow-ranked-choice-voting [hereinafter Question 5 Results].
7
See Katharine Q. Seelye, Maine Adopts Ranked-Choice Voting. What Is It, and How Will It
Work?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/us/maine-rankedchoice-voting.html.
8
Andrew Spencer et al., Escaping the Thicket: The Ranked Choice Voting Solution to
America’s Districting Crisis, 46 CUMB. L. REV. 377, 393 (2016).
9
See, e.g., Jess Bidgood, How Controversial Is Gov. Paul LePage of Maine? Here’s a Partial
List, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/30/us/controversial-govpaul-lepage-maine-list.html.
10
Nik DeCosta-Klipa, How Paul LePage Got Elected, and How Mainers Think They Can Fix
a
Broken
Voting
System,
BOSTON
GLOBE
(Sept.
1,
2016),
https://www.boston.com/news/politics/2016/09/01/how-paul-lepage-got-elected-and-howmainers-think-they-can-fix-a-broken-voting-system.
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Democratic nominee and a left-leaning independent split the vote among
Maine’s left-leaning majority. Four years later, LePage was re-elected—again
with a plurality—after a new Democratic nominee and the same left-leaning
independent again split the vote.
Although independent candidates have had significantly less of an
impact on West Virginia politics than in Maine, West Virginia’s
first-past-the-post (“FPTP”) electoral system has delivered weak-plurality
election winners on a number of occasions. The state’s newly nonpartisan
supreme-court elections, moreover, pose a serious challenge to the
representational value of the institutions they populate precisely because of the
increased likelihood of a plurality victor. With three contests for the state
supreme court scheduled for the 2020 primary election,11 the seriousness of the
problem created by plurality-winner voting systems is bound only to grow more
glaring.
West Virginians, however, have a choice. West Virginia can follow
Maine’s lead and deliver more power to voters in choosing their preferred
representatives. The passage and implementation of RCV in Maine should be
replicated by West Virginia in order to develop truly democratic representative
institutions.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to understand the need for RCV in West Virginia, it must be
established why majorities are desirable in elections, why West Virginia is
failing to produce election victors with majority backing, and why RCV would
provide an adequate remedy for this problem. The following Section provides an
adequate foundation for these assertions via a brief survey of historical trends,
election results, and state electoral systems. This Section demonstrates that the
overall national trend with regard to popular political participation has been
toward more democratic and majoritarian institutions. This Section also
examines various congressional and judicial elections in West Virginia to show
that plurality winners occur commonly in state elections and only promise to
proliferate in the future. Lastly, this Section explains the means by which RCV
produces majority winners with ease and simplicity.

11

Lacie Pierson, Loughry’s Resignation Sets Up Races for 3 Supreme Court Seats in 2020,
CHARLESTON
GAZETTE-MAIL
(Nov.
15,
2018),
https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/cops_and_courts/loughry-s-resignation-sets-up-races-forsupreme-court-seats/article_87dbeb64-04ed-53cd-bdd1-5ac2910723bc.html.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 122, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 12

326

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122

A. Voting and Majoritarianism
The role of the popular vote in electing political leadership has been a
contested matter from the country’s beginning.12 Some figures of the founding
generation saw no particular connection between democracy and the practice of
conducting elections, and instead understood republicanism and democracy to
be oppositional ideas.13 To this cohort, democracy entailed the personal
administration of government by the collective citizenry of a given community,
while a republic invested governing power in a much smaller number of elected
individuals.14 James Madison, writing pseudonymously, argued that the
republican form of government’s advantage over democracy was that it would
“refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a
chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their
country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice
it to temporary or partial considerations.”15
Founding-period law, however, significantly circumscribed the pool of
electors by whom the republican body of citizens was chosen.16 Because the
United States inherited its legal traditions from a British system in which politics
was exclusively an affair of the propertied classes, generally only white, male,
landholding adults could vote in early American elections.17 Following the lead
of frontier territories, which sought to attract settlers with the promise of laxer
requirements for the right to vote, U.S. states gradually began to move toward
universal white male suffrage.18 Voting rights explicitly restricted on the basis
of race fell after the Civil War, a reform that resulted from the abolition of slavery
following the Civil War and the incorporation of formerly enslaved black men
into a society in which universal male suffrage had established itself as the
governing standard.19 Jurisdictions shortly began expanding the franchise
beyond men as well, starting in 1870 with the Wyoming Territory—whose
legislators desperately wanted to attract female settlers to relieve the territory’s

12

See Shlomo Slonim, The Electoral College at Philadelphia: The Evolution of an Ad Hoc
Congress for the Selection of a President, 73 J. AM. HIST. 35, 38 (1986).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (“[D]emocracies have ever been spectacles of
turbulence and contention . . . . A republic . . . opens a different prospect, and promises the cure
for which we are seeking.”).
14
Id.
13

15

Id.
Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, The Evolution of Suffrage Institutions in the
New World, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 891, 895 (2005).
17
Id.
16

18

Id. at 899.
See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at
278–79 (updated ed. 2014).
19
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sex ratio of six men for every woman20—and culminating with the Nineteenth
Amendment’s extension of the franchise to all adult women 50 years later.21
One consequence of the democratizing trend in the United States was
blowback from elements of society threatened by majority rule.22 John C.
Calhoun—dubbed the “Marx of the Master Class” by historian Richard
Hofstadter for his contributions to political theory on behalf of the slave-owning
class23—was perhaps the most notable opponent of popular democracy in the
antebellum period.24 Calhoun theorized a modification of the U.S. constitutional
system called “concurrent majority” that would give minority interests
(i.e., slaveholders) veto power over decisions made by the majority.25 Being a
slaveholder himself, and representing South Carolina—at one point the Union’s
wealthiest state and, by percentage, its most enslaved—in the United States
Senate, Calhoun sought to restrict to the greatest possible degree the extent to
which a numerical majority could exert power over the state.26 Although Calhoun
died in 1850, his legacy was later embodied in the government of the
Confederate States of America, which honored Calhoun by depicting his image
on Confederate currency.27 Unfortunately for that legacy, the Union victory in
the Civil War prevented the proponents of minority rule from overcoming the
overall trend of expanded enfranchisement.28
Perhaps the most enduring organ of antidemocratic power in American
government is the Electoral College.29 The Electoral College originated in the
Constitution as a deliberative body comprising electors chosen by state
20

Tom Rea, Right Choice, Wrong Reasons: Wyoming Women Win the Right to Vote,
WYOHISTORY.ORG (Nov. 8, 2014), https://www.wyohistory.org/encyclopedia/right-choice-wrongreasons-wyoming-women-win-right-vote.
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 403 (paperback ed. 2006).
See COREY ROBIN, THE REACTIONARY MIND: CONSERVATISM FROM EDMUND BURKE TO
DONALD TRUMP 6 (2d ed. 2018).
23
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT
67–68 (1948).
24
See NANCY MACLEAN, DEMOCRACY IN CHAINS: THE DEEP HISTORY OF THE RADICAL
RIGHT’S STEALTH P LAN FOR AMERICA 1–2 (2017).
25
See JOHN C. CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT AND A DISCOURSE ON THE
CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 28, 47–48 (1851).
26
See MACLEAN, supra note 24, at 2–3, 5.
21
22

27
See John C. Calhoun, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/people/john-c-calhoun.htm
(last updated Nov. 11, 2018).
28

See FONER, supra note 19.
See Jason Brennan, The Electoral College Is Anti-Democratic—And That’s a Good Thing,
MARKETWATCH (Nov. 8, 2016, 8:39 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-electoralcollege-is-anti-democraticand-thats-a-good-thing-2016-09-12; John Nichols, The Electoral
College Has the Starkly Anti-Democratic Power to Make a Loser a “Winner”, NATION (Dec. 15,
2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-electoral-college-has-the-starkly-anti-democraticpower-to-make-a-loser-a-winner/.
29
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legislatures that would elect the President every four years.30 Because the
Constitution permits states to select their own method of appointing electors,
most states (with the notable exceptions of South Carolina until 1868 and
Colorado in 1876) quickly opted to put the selection of electors to popular vote,
and over time, the selection looked more-or-less like voting directly for one
presidential candidate or another.31 In the Progressive Era, reformers brought
another institution similarly removed from popular power under democratic
control, amending the Constitution to fill U.S. Senate seats by direct election.32
But the Electoral College remained, and in the elections of 1876, 1888, 2000,
and 2016, it handed victory to presidential candidates who failed to win the
popular vote.33
The Electoral College, however, represents an exception to the
democratizing trend. The expansion of the franchise from its rarefied,
property-mediated beginnings in the late eighteenth century to its present-day
breadth suggests that a transformation occurred in the way Americans
understood the purpose of voting. Although the typical politico in James
Madison’s generation would have categorically rejected such a thing as
American “democracy,” succeeding generations of Americans embraced the
word and rendered it synonymous with the American project.34 The result of the
upheavals of the nineteenth century was that the word “democratic” no longer
described a form of government distinct and opposed to a “republican”
alternative, but rather the extent to which a republican government is accountable
to its electorate and of whom that electorate is composed.
B. Voting in West Virginia and Elsewhere
In West Virginia, as in every other state to some extent, the winner of a
given election is the candidate who receives more votes than any other

30

See Slonim, supra note 12, at 52.

31

See Devin McCarthy, How the Electoral College Became Winner-Take-All, FAIRVOTE
(Aug. 21, 2012), https://www.fairvote.org/how-the-electoral-college-became-winner-take-all.
32

See John J. Dinan, Progressivism and Federalism, in KEEPING THE COMPOUND REPUBLIC:
ESSAYS ON AMERICAN FEDERALISM 105, 105 (Martha Derthick ed., 2001); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. XVII.
33
Alvin Chang, Trump Will Be the 4th President to Win the Electoral College After Getting
Fewer
Votes
Than
His
Opponent,
VOX,
https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2016/11/9/13572112/trump-popular-vote-loss (last updated Dec. 19, 2016, 1:37 PM).
34
See President Ronald Reagan, Westminster Address (June 8, 1982) (“If the rest of this
century is to witness the gradual growth of freedom and democratic ideals, we must take actions
to assist the campaign for democracy.”); President Woodrow Wilson, Address Delivered at Joint
Session of the Two Houses of Congress (Apr. 2, 1917) (“The world must be made safe for
democracy.”).
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candidate.35 This system is called FPTP voting.36 Because this method does not
require that a candidate win a majority of the vote, candidates who receive a
plurality of the vote frequently win elections despite the majority of participating
voters choosing someone else. FPTP is the method by which elections are
decided at every level of the West Virginia electoral system, including primary
and general elections. Crucially, however, the word “plurality” does not appear
in the state constitution, neither in reference to how electoral victors are decided
nor in any other context.37
Some other states use electoral systems designed to preclude plurality
victors in certain elections. Eleven states provide for a runoff election following
a regular election if no candidate receives a majority of the vote.38 In these
runoffs, the top two candidates from the regular election compete in a second
election held several weeks after the initial election or the state legislature
decides the contest. Reducing the field of candidates to two ensures that one
candidate will receive a majority. Most of the states that allow for runoffs only
use them at the primary stage, but two states—Mississippi and Georgia—
conduct a runoff election in the event that no candidate in the general election
receives a majority. Louisiana differs from the rest in that it holds its primary
election—which includes all candidates regardless of party—at the same time as
other states’ general elections in November, providing for a subsequent general
election only in the event that no candidate wins a majority.39 While these states,
South Dakota excepted,40 use runoff elections for all levels of elective office, all
states use a simple FPTP system without the possibility of a runoff for allocating
electoral votes in presidential elections.41

35

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-5-4(b) (West 2019) (“In primary elections a plurality of the votes
cast shall be sufficient for the nomination of candidates for office.”); id. § 3-6-11 (“The person
having the highest number of votes for any one of such offices shall be declared duly elected
thereto . . . .”).
36
Charles
King,
Electoral
Systems,
GEO.
U.
(2000),
http://faculty.georgetown.edu/kingch/Electoral_Systems.htm.
37
See generally W. VA. CONST.
38
Primary Runoffs, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/electionsand-campaigns/primary-runoffs.aspx (last visited Oct. 17, 2019).
39
How Are Statewide and Local Candidates Elected?, LA. DEP’T ST.,
https://www.sos.la.gov/ElectionsAndVoting/GetElectionInformation/HowAreCandidatesElected/
Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 17, 2019).
40
Primary Runoffs, supra note 38.
41
See Thomas Berry, A Presidential-Election Runoff Would Be Legal for States to Adopt,
NAT’L REV. (Apr. 14, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/04/presidentialelection-runoff-states/.
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West Virginia’s voting system is unlike most others, however, in that it
regularly conducts multiple-winner elections.42 The lower house of the state
legislature, the 100-member West Virginia House of Delegates, has been divided
into 67 districts since the 2012 elections.43 Many districts are single-member, but
others are represented by as many as four or five delegates.44 In state-house
elections in multi-member districts, voters have as many votes as there are seats
up for election, meaning that a voter in a four-member district has the
opportunity to allocate those votes among as many as four candidates of her
choosing. These votes are not stackable, i.e., a voter in this scenario cannot put
two of her four votes toward one candidate. Because this system allows for large
number of candidates in elections where voters have multiple votes to allocate,
winning candidates regularly receive relatively small percentages of the vote.45
C. Plurality Victors in Congressional Elections
The use of FPTP voting in West Virginia’s partisan primary elections
has led to a number of notable plurality winners in just the last decade. Unlike
general elections, which have significant barriers to entry for someone seeking a
place on the ballot without a major party’s nomination,46 the only actual barrier
for a qualified state resident to gain ballot access in the primary is the filing fee.47
The result of this is that primary elections in West Virginia routinely produce
nominees who failed to secure majorities from their parties’ voters, and in highprofile contests that draw large numbers of candidates, the winner’s plurality can
be extraordinarily small.48
The 2014 Republican primary for West Virginia’s second congressional
district was one such high-profile contest. Shelley Moore Capito had held the
seat for 14 years, but in 2014, she declined to run for re-election in order to run

See Ben Williams, West Virginia Moves to Single Member Districts, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES: NCSL BLOG (Apr. 10, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/blog/2018/04/10/west-virginiamoves-to-single-member-districts.aspx.
42

43
44

See id.
Id.

45
See generally Statewide Results: General Election – November 8, 2016, W. VA. SECRETARY
ST.,
http://services.sos.wv.gov/apps/elections/results/results.aspx?year=2016&eid=23&county=State
wide (last visited Oct. 17, 2019) [hereinafter 2016 W. Va. General Election]. The winning
candidates for the five seats representing District 51 in the state house won between 9.48% and
11.84% of the vote. Id.
46
47

See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-5-23 (West 2019).
See id. § 3-5-7(a).

48
See Simone Pathé, West Virginia House Matchups Set for November, ROLL CALL (May 8,
2018, 11:12 PM), https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/west-virginia-house-matchups-setnovember.
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for a seat in the U.S. Senate opened up by the retirement of five-term Senator
Jay Rockefeller.49 Having been the only Republican-held U.S. House seat in
West Virginia from 2001 to 2011, West Virginia’s second congressional district
was regarded as a relatively safe open seat for Republicans to defend in the 2014
midterm elections. This reputation as a Republican-friendly district drew seven
candidates to compete for the Republican nomination in the open district.
The contest for West Virginia’s second congressional district was also
influenced by the varied geographical profile of the district, which stretches from
the Ohio River in the west to the Shenandoah River in the east.50 The district is
anchored on either end by Charleston—the state capital and principal city in the
populous Kanawha Valley—and Martinsburg, the largest city in the state’s
fast-growing Eastern Panhandle. The decision by Shelley Moore Capito, who
resides in Charleston, to decline re-election signaled an opportunity for Eastern
Panhandle residents to use the clout gained from the area’s late population bloom
to send one of their own to Congress instead of settling for a representative from
the other side of the state.51 Hence, the candidates who decided to run for the seat
and the subsequent results reflected some geographical tension created by the
shape of the district.
The result of the seven-candidate contest was that the winning candidate,
former Maryland State Senator Alex Mooney,52 won with just over 36% of the
vote. The second and third-place finishers, Ken Reed and Charlotte Lane
respectively, combined for more than 40% of the vote, and with the fourth-place
finisher, Steve Harrison, included, the vote totals of the first three runners-up
comprised a majority of votes cast.53 Mooney was particularly controversial at
the time because of his apparently limited connections to the state, having first
moved to West Virginia a few months prior to the primary election.54 Mooney
would go on to win the general election by a narrow margin with only a plurality

49
Aaron Blake, Rep. Shelley Moore Capito Will Run for Senate, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2012,
10:56 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2012/11/25/rep-shelley-moorecapito-will-run-for-senate.
50
Shauna Johnson, Alex Mooney Wins GOP Nomination in 2nd District, W. VA. METRONEWS
(May 13, 2014, 9:46 PM), http://wvmetronews.com/2014/05/13/alex-mooney-wins-republicannomination-in-2nd-district/.
51
Jonathan Matisse, Eastern Panhandle Politics Shaping West Virginia, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB. (Aug. 2, 2014, 8:51 AM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-easternpanhandle-politics-shaping-west-virginia-2014aug02-story.html.
52
Theodore Schleifer, With Eyes on Seats in Maryland and West Virginia, Politicians Cross
Borders, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/01/us/politics/nickcasey-alex-mooney-midterm-elections.html.
53
See Statewide Results: Primary Election – May 13, 2014, W. VA. SECRETARY ST.,
http://services.sos.wv.gov/apps/elections/results/results.aspx?year=2014&eid=14&county=State
wide (last visited Oct. 17, 2019).
54

Schleifer, supra note 52.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019

9

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 122, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 12

332

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122

of the vote.55 Notably, the Republican share of the vote in West Virginia’s second
congressional district declined by more than 20 percentage points between 2012
and 2014.56
Following their 2014 disappointment, Democrats in the second
congressional district were enthusiastic to take on the evidently vulnerable
Mooney when he ran for re-election in 2016.57 Five Democrats filed for the
party’s nomination in West Virginia’s second congressional district and the
result was quite similar to what Republicans experienced two years earlier. Mark
Hunt, a former state delegate, won the primary with just 29% of the vote,58 much
of which came from the district’s western counties.59 The candidate preferred by
the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (“DCCC”), Cory Simpson,
placed second.60 In third place came Tom Payne, who dominated the Eastern
Panhandle counties as a consequence of being the only candidate from the region
in the race despite being relatively unknown.61 The influence of geography on
the outcome of the election was so clear that when asked if he would have done
something differently in hindsight to improve his election-night performance,
Simpson responded, “Had an Eastern Panhandle address? I don’t know.”62 Mark
Hunt, the choice of less than one in three Democratic primary voters in the

See Statewide Results: General Election – November 4, 2014, W. VA. SECRETARY ST.,
http://services.sos.wv.gov/apps/elections/results/results.aspx?year=2014&eid=21&county=State
wide (last visited Oct. 17, 2019) [hereinafter 2014 W. Va. General Election].
56
Compare id. (showing Republican Alex Mooney winning West Virginia’s second
congressional district in 2014 with 47.08% of the vote), with Statewide Results: General Election
–
November
6,
2012,
W.
VA.
SECRETARY
ST.,
http://services.sos.wv.gov/apps/elections/results/results.aspx?year=2012&eid=13&county=State
wide (last visited Oct. 17, 2019) (showing Republican Shelley Moore Capito winning West
Virginia’s second congressional district in 2012 with 69.77% of the vote).
57
See Lauren French, House Democrats Pick Top Republican Targets, POLITICO (Feb. 11,
2016, 6:01 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/02/house-democrats-republican-targets219118 (listing West Virginia’s second congressional district among the first targets of the
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee’s Red to Blue program in 2016).
58
Statewide Results: Primary Election – May 10, 2016, W. VA. SECRETARY ST.,
http://services.sos.wv.gov/apps/elections/results/results.aspx?year=2016&eid=22&county=State
wide (last visited Oct. 17, 2019) [hereinafter 2016 W. Va. Primary Election].
55

59

See David Gutman, Subterfuge, Favoritism Charges Emerge After Hunt Wins WV House
Race,
CHARLESTON
GAZETTE-MAIL
(May
11,
2016),
https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/politics/subterfuge-favoritism-charges-emerge-after-huntwins-wv-house-race/article_99a3cb73-38a4-5cf9-962b-cb489042f294.html.
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district, lost easily in the general election as Mooney improved on his 2014
performance by more than ten percentage points.63
Another similar contest came in 2018 in West Virginia’s third
congressional district. The third district was a longtime Democratic stronghold
until Republican-turned-Democrat State Senator Evan Jenkins defeated
incumbent Democrat Nick Rahall in 2014.64 Jenkins coasted to re-election in
201665 as Donald Trump won the district by nearly 50 points in the presidential
election.66 Because of the decisive Republican advantage in the district (at least
on the federal level), Jenkins’s decision to forego re-election to run for U.S.
Senate in 2018 caused a rush among both Republicans and Democrats to succeed
him.67
This race, like the Republican primary in the second congressional
district four years earlier, attracted seven Republicans vying for one spot,
although one candidate—Philip Payton—ended his campaign prior to the
election due to potential liability under the Hatch Act.68 The result, however, was
even more level across the field than the crowded second-district contest in 2014.
The victorious candidate, State Delegate Carol Miller, won the election with just
under 24% of the vote, with three other candidates receiving at least 18% of the
vote.69
In other states, plurality winners such as Carol Miller, Alex Mooney, and
Mark Hunt would have had to face the first runner-up in a runoff election a
number of weeks after the initial election.70 It is unknown what the results would
have been in either election, given the nuances and opacity of voters’ intentions

63

Compare 2014 W. Va. General Election, supra note 55 (showing Republican Alex Mooney
winning West Virginia’s second congressional district in 2014 with 47.08% of the vote), with 2016
W. Va. General Election, supra note 45 (showing Mooney winning re-election in West Virginia’s
second congressional district with 58.18% of the vote).
64
Tarini Parti, Rahall’s 38 Years in House End, POLITICO (Nov. 4, 2014, 10:19 PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2014/11/2014-west-virginia-election-results-evan-jenkins-nickrahall-112527.
65
2016 W. Va. General Election, supra note 45.
66
Jeff Jenkins, Monmouth Poll: Miller, Ojeda Locked in Tight Race, W. VA. METRONEWS
(Oct. 16, 2018), http://wvmetronews.com/2018/10/16/monmouth-poll-miller-ojeda-locked-intight-race/.
67
John Raby, Crowded Field Seeks 3rd District House Seat in West Virginia, SEATTLE TIMES
(May 3, 2018, 8:18 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/crowded-field-seeks-3rddistrict-house-seat-in-west-virginia/.
68
Taylor Stuck, Payton Withdraws from House 3 Race, HERALD-DISPATCH (Huntington, W.
Va.) (Apr. 20, 2018), http://www.herald-dispatch.com/elections/payton-withdraws-from-houserace/article_5d215b2c-ea66-510b-9565-98e7e7ab5c62.html.
69
See
May
8,
2018,
Primary
Election,
W.
VA.
SECRETARY
ST.,
http://results.enr.clarityelections.com/WV/74487/Web02-state.195772/#/ (last visited Oct. 17,
2019).
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See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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when they select a candidate for which to vote, but the legitimacy of the
democratic process is called into question when the system allows a candidate
who was not the first choice for three out of four Republican voters proceed to
the general election.
D. Plurality Victors in Judicial Elections
West Virginia elects its judiciary from top to bottom. Judges on the
municipal, magistrate, family, circuit, and state supreme court levels are subject
to election by popular vote and all the pressures and influences that follow.71
Shortly after Republicans took control of the state legislature following the 2014
elections, legislators undertook efforts purportedly to preserve popular control
over the judiciary while easing concerns that partisan bias might have infected
the facially impartial legal system. On March 25, 2015, Governor Earl Ray
Tomblin signed into law H.B. 2010, which provided for nonpartisan elections
conducted at the date of the primary election for all state-level judges.72
The first nonpartisan state supreme court election was conducted in
2016, pitting the incumbent Republican Brent Benjamin against one Republican
opponent and three Democrats, including a former state supreme court justice
and Attorney General Darrell McGraw and former State Senator William
Wooton.73 In the nominally nonpartisan race, outside money poured into the state
as conservative donors deserted Benjamin and rallied around Beth Walker, a
Republican supreme-court candidate who had run for the office before.74 The
final results of the election reflected the consolidation of traditionally Republican
money around Walker’s candidacy as she prevailed with less than 40% of the
vote while McGraw and Wooton received approximately 23% and 21%
respectively.75 The incumbent Benjamin placed a distant fourth with just 12% of
the vote.76 Unlike the plurality-winner House primaries discussed earlier, whose

71
Judicial Selection in the States: West Virginia, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS.,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=WV (last visited Oct. 17,
2019).
72
Stephanie Wilmes, West Virginia Moves to Nonpartisan Judicial Elections in 2016, WM. &
MARY L. SCH.: ST. ELECTIONS (Nov. 2, 2015), http://electls.blogs.wm.edu/2015/11/02/westvirginia-moves-to-nonpartisan-judicial-elections-in-2016/.
73
See Shauna Johnson, On the Campaign Trail: Beth Walker, State Supreme Court Candidate,
W. VA. METRONEWS (Apr. 11, 2016, 12:05 AM), http://wvmetronews.com/2016/04/11/on-thecampaign-trail-beth-walker-state-supreme-court-candidate/.
74
David Gutman, Third-Party Pours into WV Supreme Court Race, CHARLESTON GAZETTEMAIL (Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/cops_and_courts/third-partymoney-pours-into-wv-supreme-court-race/article_b2665e9c-475e-58b1-a8b62b804d14d883.html.
75
See 2016 W. Va. Primary Election, supra note 58.
76

See id.
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victors at least have the check of having to face the other party’s nominee in the
general election, the winner of the state supreme court election would not face a
second electoral fight in November because the nonpartisan election system had
scheduled the general election for the state supreme court at the same time as the
state’s primary elections.77
In 2018, the limits of nonpartisan judicial elections were foregrounded
again in the fallout from the impeachment crisis at the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals. In order to avoid a federal indictment, Democratic Justice
Menis Ketchum resigned from the court,78 and amid the impeachment
proceedings against the other four justices, another Democratic justice, Robin
Davis, resigned in order to trigger a special election the coming November.79 As
a result, two nonpartisan special supreme court elections were scheduled to be
decided alongside the regular 2018 general election contests. Each of these two
special elections featured ten candidates, a situation which was accurately
predicted to be a recipe for victorious candidates winning with slim pluralities.80
The victorious candidates in West Virginia’s special supreme court
elections indeed won with small pluralities. Tim Armstead, the former
Republican Speaker of the House of Delegates who had been appointed to the
supreme court seat vacated by Ketchum,81 won the opportunity to finish out the
two years remaining in the term with just over 26% of the vote.82 By comparison,
the vote totals of the next four runners-up combined constituted a majority of
votes cast in the race.83 And yet, the preferences of this majority, as well as the

77

Wilmes, supra note 72 (“[T]he new law fixes the date of judicial elections on the day of the
primary rather than the general election.”).
78

Lori Kersey & Lacie Pierson, On Eve of Impeachment Meetings, Ketchum Quits WV
Supreme
Court,
CHARLESTON
GAZETTE-MAIL
(July
11,
2018),
https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/politics/on-eve-of-impeachment-meetings-ketchum-quitswv-supreme-court/article_0bb52c20-b886-53c9-b221-b3f3991554ce.html.
79

Lacie Pierson & Jake Zuckerman, WV Supreme Court Justice Davis Leaves Court; Justices
Workman, Walker to Stay, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (Aug. 14, 2018),
https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/politics/wv-supreme-court-justice-davis-leaves-courtjustices-workman-walker/article_91a8f5ae-0030-5c98-b6e2-639827e46929.html.
80
Hoppy Kercheval, Editorial, WV Supreme Court Vacancies Will Be Filled by Small
Percentage of Voters, W. VA. METRONEWS (Aug. 24, 2018, 12:24 AM),
http://wvmetronews.com/2018/08/24/wv-supreme-court-vacancies-will-be-filled-by-smallpercentage-of-voters/.
81
Caity Coyne, Armstead, Jenkins Win Supreme Court Races, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL
(Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/election_2018/armstead-jenkins-win-supremecourt-races/article_f369ac31-b86c-541f-845a-17937a4ae3c6.html.
82
See November 6, 2018, General Election, W. VA. SECRETARY ST.,
https://results.enr.clarityelections.com/WV/92360/Web02-state.221451/#/ (last visited Oct. 17,
2019) [hereinafter 2018 W. Va. General Election].
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See id.
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larger majority of all voters who chose a candidate other than Armstead, are left
unreflected in the actual representational makeup of the court.
Evan Jenkins, the appointee to the court’s other vacant seat, won with a
larger plurality than Armstead, but a mere plurality nonetheless.84 Jenkins, who
benefited from the name recognition afforded by a 20-year career in the state
legislature, four years of service in the U.S. House of Representatives, and a
high-profile campaign for the Republican nomination for U.S. Senate just a few
months earlier, won just over 36% of the vote.85 In a similar outcome to
Armstead’s victory, the vote totals of the first six runners-up combined for a
majority of the vote in Jenkins’s election.86 The third of the electorate captured
by Jenkins was, however, enough to win the former representative the right to
serve out the remaining six years of Davis’s unfinished 12-year term.87
Taken together, recent elections in West Virginia have exposed antimajoritarian flaws in the FPTP system through the election of various plurality
victors in partisan congressional primary contests. The faults in this system are
magnified by the recent innovation of nonpartisan supreme court elections,
which feature the same FPTP free-for-alls as primary elections but with the
uneasy weight of finality included. With the post-election resignation of Justice
Allen Loughry, the 2020 primary election will feature three supreme court
elections on the ballot at once.88 The state’s first three nonpartisan supreme court
elections having produced three plurality winners, there is little reason to expect
that the next three will produce anything different.
E. Ranked-Choice Voting
RCV encodes the principle of majoritarianism into the electoral
system.89 RCV works by asking voters to rank candidates in an election
according to their preference. This is in contrast to FPTP, which asks voters to
select one candidate out of all those running for a particular office. Instead of
making a singular selection as to their favorite candidate, voters’ selections in an
RCV system are denoted as first-choice, second-choice, etc. If no first-choice
candidate receives a majority of the vote, the candidate with the fewest
first-choice votes is eliminated and her first-choice votes default to the
84

Coyne, supra note 81.

85

2018 W. Va. General Election, supra note 82.
See id.

86

87
Brad McElhinny, Evan Jenkins and Tim Armstead Win Supreme Court Seats, W. VA.
METRONEWS (Nov. 6, 2018, 10:34 PM), http://wvmetronews.com/2018/11/06/supreme-courtraces-election-night-draft/.
88
Pierson, supra note 11.
89
Rosa O’Hara, Opinion, How Australia Could Fix U.S. Elections, WASH. POST (Mar. 22,
2018, 3:18 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/03/22/rankedchoice-voting/.
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second-choice picks on those ballots, which are redistributed accordingly in an
instant runoff. If one candidate receives a majority after this redistribution, that
candidate wins. If not, the process repeats with the elimination of the new
last-place candidate until a majority is achieved.
Preferential systems share nomenclature and an interest in
majoritarianism with runoff systems, but there are important differences. First,
the RCV system requires voters to cast just one ballot, while the runoff system
asks voters to return to the polls weeks after the initial election.90 Another
difference is that RCV captures the shades of detail in voter preference more
accurately than a regular runoff. In an RCV election, for example, a relatively
popular third-place candidate in a five-candidate election has the opportunity to
demonstrate his broad appeal by gaining ground from second- or third-choice
preference votes, while in a regular runoff election, such a candidate would be
shut out completely after the first election.
III. THE RANKED-CHOICE EXPERIMENT IN MAINE
A. Question 5: The Battle at the Ballot
The legal wrangling over RCV in Maine began when voters approved
the statewide adoption of the voting system in 2016.91 The ballot initiative posed
the following question to voters: “Do you want to allow voters to rank their
choices of candidates in elections for U.S. Senate, Congress, Governor, State
Senate, and State Representative, and to have ballots counted at the state level in
multiple rounds in which last-place candidates are eliminated until a candidate
wins by majority?”92 Maine, already at odds electorally with the rest of the
country as one of only two states to allocate its presidential electoral votes by
congressional district and not winner-take-all,93 puzzled over whether to further
distinguish its electoral system.
Mainers divided over the proposed overhaul to its voting methods.
Proponents of Question 5’s passage argued that the incumbent system of
plurality voting discouraged the electorate from evaluating candidates on their
merit and instead forced voters to weigh their preference for a candidate against
the likelihood that their vote would enable victory for a more viable but

90

Primary Runoffs, supra note 38.

91

See Question 5 Results, supra note 6.
Press Release, Dep’t of the Sec’y of State of Me., Secretary Dunlap Announces Final
Wording
of
Referendum
Questions
(June
23,
2016),
https://www.maine.gov/sos/news/2016/referendumquestions.html.
92

93
Edward D. Murphy, Trump Takes 1 of Maine’s 4 Electoral Votes, in a First for the State,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.pressherald.com/2016/11/08/mainers-takematters-into-their-own-hands-after-bitter-presidential-campaign/.
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less-preferred candidate.94 Advocates for RCV argued that preferential voting
would free Maine voters from this bind and allow them to vote their consciences
instead.95 Noting that the Republican–Democratic party duopoly that had once
had the moderating effect of consolidating public opinion into two electoral
options no longer controlled the independent-minded Maine electorate, some
supporters of Question 5 praised the potential for RCV to lead to the election of
consensus-minded candidates, as candidates would theoretically strive to appeal
to the broadest possible coalition of interests in order to obtain both first-round
and later-round votes.96
Opponents saw less to be enthusiastic about in Question 5. Those
opposed to RCV argued that the purported benefits of adopting a preferential
voting system were unlikely to materialize.97 One opponent argued that the
prospect of ballot exhaustion—the phenomenon in which voters “undervote” by
ranking only some of the candidates and thus exhaust their ballot when all of
their chosen candidates are eliminated—negated the majoritarian arguments in
RCV’s favor, citing the rates of ballot exhaustion in municipalities that had
already implemented RCV for local elections.98 Opponents also cast doubt on
the proposition that RCV would result in consensus building. To the contrary,
they argued, RCV could have a negligible effect on political polarization as
similarly disposed parties on one side of the spectrum would simply coalesce
against parties on the other side.99
Once ballots were counted, Maine voters made history twice in the 2016
election. First, Maine split its electoral votes between two presidential candidates
for the first time since the state adopted a district-based electoral vote allocation
system in 1972, delivering Donald Trump one electoral vote from the state’s
second congressional district.100 Second, supporters of Question 5 prevailed with
52% of the vote and Maine became poised to adopt RCV for state-level
elections.101 The ensuing legal battle, however, ensured that Maine’s path to
implementing preferential voting would be far more complicated than simply
following the 2016 up-or-down vote in its favor.

94
Editorial, Our Opinion: Support Question 5 to Bring Back Consensus Politics, PORTLAND
PRESS HERALD (Oct. 16, 2016), https://www.centralmaine.com/2016/10/16/our-opinion-supportquestion-5-to-bring-back-consensus-politics/.
95
Id.
96

Id.
Simon Waxman, Ranked-Choice Voting Is Not the Solution, DEMOCRACY (Nov. 3, 2016,
3:03 PM), https://democracyjournal.org/arguments/ranked-choice-voting-is-not-the-solution/.
98
Id.
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B. Legislative and Judicial Roadblocks
One of the central arguments advanced by opponents of RCV in Maine
was that the system would violate the Maine constitution.102 State Senator
Heather Sirocki, a vocal opponent of preferential voting, cited a letter from the
state attorney general that suggested that RCV would face constitutional
obstacles if voters were to vote in favor of Question 5.103 Then–Attorney General
Janet T. Mills highlighted the use of the word “plurality” in the context of
declaring victors in elections in more than one clause of the state constitution.104
Specifically, the state constitution instructs the Governor to examine the
municipally tabulated vote totals for elections to the state house of
representatives and “issue a summons to such persons as shall appear to have
been elected by a plurality of all votes returned.”105 Provisions governing the
election of individuals to the state senate are worded similarly to those
controlling elections to the state house, deploying the word “plurality” to
describe the requirements for victory.106 The state constitution further describes
the requirement for discerning victorious candidates in gubernatorial elections,
instructing that “votes shall be received, sorted, counted and declared and
recorded, in the same manner as those for Senators and Representatives”107 and
that a gubernatorial election winner should be declared “in case of a choice by
plurality of all the votes returned.”108
The Maine Senate found these issues troubling enough that it decided to
seek an official disposition on the matter. The Senate voted three months after
the passage of Question 5 to request that the state supreme court decide on the
constitutionality of RCV before its ultimate implementation in 2018, a maneuver

102
Heather Sirocki, Ranked Choice Voting: Wrong for Maine & Blatantly Unconstitutional,
ME. WIRE (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.themainewire.com/2016/03/ranked-choice-voting-wrongmaine-blatantly-unconstitutional/.
103
Id. (citing Letter from Attorney Gen. Janet T. Mills, Me., to President Michael D.
Thibodeau,
Me.
Senate
(Mar.
4,
2016),
https://www.maine.gov/ag/about/opinions/AG%20Opinion%20RCV%20March%204%202016.p
df).
104
Letter from Attorney Gen. Janet T. Mills, Me., to President Michael D. Thibodeau, Me.
Senate
(Mar.
4,
2016),
https://www.maine.gov/ag/about/opinions/AG%20Opinion%20RCV%20March%204%202016.p
df.
105
ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 5.
106
107
108

Id. pt. 2, §§ 3–5.
Id. art. V, pt. 1, § 3.
Id.
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constitutionally employed only for “solemn occasions.”109 While some senators
were unclear on the actual solemnity of the occasion, both pro- and anti–
Question 5 senators voted in support of the request in order to resolve the matter
with some finality.110
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court heard oral arguments on the
questions posed by the state senate and issued a unanimous opinion against the
constitutionality of RCV on May 23, 2017.111 Finding first that it was authorized
to answer the Senate’s request for an opinion on RCV given the seriousness of
the prospect of electing candidates under an unconstitutional system,112 the court
ruled that a preferential voting system, as described by the referendum question,
would be unconstitutional because any system in which voting would be
conducted in rounds could violate the plurality requirement described in the state
constitution.113 The court reasoned that a scenario in which one candidate
receives a plurality of the vote in the first round but loses after second-preference
votes are redistributed in the second round would plainly run afoul of the state
constitution’s requirement that candidates with a plurality of the vote be declared
winners in their respective elections.114
Maine legislators then grappled with the burden of balancing voters’
express support for an RCV system and the evident constitutional hurdles to
implementing their wishes. Failing both to repeal the new law and to pass a
constitutional amendment, the legislature endorsed in a special session a bill that
would postpone the implementation of RCV indefinitely without a
voter-approved constitutional amendment before 2021. Those in favor of RCV
responded by filing the requisite number of signatures to put forward a “people’s
veto,” a process in which the electorate may overturn an act of the legislature by
popular referendum, in this case held concurrently with the subsequent primary
election on June 12, 2018.
With the delay bill submitted for voters’ approval, the question turned
to the method of voting Maine would use in its primary election. The state
supreme court held in a narrow ruling that the secretary of state was obligated to
follow the law as it stood and ordered the implementation of RCV for the
primaries, which were not subject to the court’s prior advisory opinion on the
constitutionality of RCV in a state general election. With the use of RCV

109

Scott Thistle, Maine Senate Asks for Court Opinion on Ranked-Choice Voting, PORTLAND
PRESS HERALD (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.pressherald.com/2017/02/02/senate-debates-whetherto-ask-for-court-opinion-on-ranked-choice-voting/.
110
Id.
111

In re Op. of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court Given Under the Provisions of Article
VI, Section 3 of the Me. Constitution, 162 A.3d 188 (Me. 2017).
112
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Id. at 208.
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confirmed, voters would get the opportunity to vote again on RCV not as a
theoretical matter, but as the method of voting they actually use.
The results of the people’s-veto referendum would suggest that Maine
voters liked what they saw on their primary ballots. Supporters of RCV grew
their majority to 55% in their victorious campaign to veto the legislature’s delay
bill. With RCV protected from legislative shenanigans and restricted to
constitutionally permissible offices through the general election, the stage was
set for RCV’s first general-election test.
C. Implementation
The first high-profile election in Maine to be subjected to the rigors of
RCV was the 2018 election for the state’s second congressional district.115 In this
race that captured national attention, the two-term incumbent Republican Bruce
Poliquin faced a challenge not only from Democratic state representative Jared
Golden, but also from two independent candidates, Will Hoar and Tiffany
Bond.116 The expansive, rural blue-state district was notable for splitting Maine’s
electoral votes in 2016 for the first time ever, giving one of Maine’s four electoral
votes to Donald Trump.117 Observers noted during the campaign that the new
RCV system in use in Maine would be likely to have an effect on the outcome
of the election, given the number of candidates and the district’s recent support
for Democratic congressional representation.118
The initial outcome of the election in the second congressional district
was indeed that no candidate received a majority of the vote, triggering an
RCV-mediated second round of vote tabulation.119 Poliquin received a plurality
with 46.4% of the first-round votes, but the difference between Poliquin’s share
and Golden’s 45.5% share was close enough that the election would be decided
by the second-preference votes of the approximately 8% of voters who chose
one of the two independent candidates on their first ballot.120 With the two

115

Colin Woodard, Maine’s Pioneering Ranked-Choice Election Likely to Catch on
Nationally,
PORTLAND
PRESS
HERALD
(Nov.
18,
2018),
https://www.pressherald.com/2018/11/18/maines-pioneering-ranked-choice-election-likely-tocatch-on-nationally/.
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Steve Collins, Nation’s Eyes on Maine’s 2nd District, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Oct. 7,
2018), https://www.pressherald.com/2018/10/07/maines-2nd-district-race-among-the-liveliest-inthe-nation/.
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independents mathematically eliminated from contention, their second-round
votes were redistributed at once, breaking overwhelmingly for Golden.121 Those
votes pushed Golden above the majority threshold, resulting in his victory and
the incumbent Poliquin’s defeat.122
Poliquin had filed a last-ditch legal challenge to the RCV law prior to
the final vote count, but after the second-round votes handed the election to
Golden, the incumbent congressman amended his complaint and requested that
the court order either that only the first-round votes be counted or that a do-over
election be scheduled.123 The U.S. District Court for the District of Maine
rejected Poliquin’s arguments that RCV was too confusing for voters and that
the system disenfranchised voters who declined to rank all the listed candidates,
holding that the courts are in no position to second-guess Maine’s decisions
regarding its voting methods.124 Despite assurances from Poliquin’s attorney that
the ruling would be appealed to the fullest extent,125 Poliquin tweeted his
concession of the entire matter that Christmas Eve.126 Further litigation would
not prevent the successful implementation of RCV in its Maine debut.
Maine’s second district was as close to an ideal testing ground for RCV
as a state could muster. Although the district had a long history of retaining
incumbents so long as they opted for re-election,127 the district leans only slightly
toward Republicans and the 2018 midterm elections were expected to favor
Democratic candidates nationwide. Maine is also one of the few states where
independent and third-party candidates, including one of the state’s U.S.
Senators, routinely run competitive and occasionally successful campaigns.128
Being a method of conducting elections that protects third-party candidates from
the spoiler effect, RCV would be expected to present independent-minded voters
with a particularly risk-free opportunity to vote for a candidate from outside the
two major parties. Given the marginality of the district, such defections would
be more likely (a) to affect the outcome of the election and (b) to be ordinarily
subject to greater-than-usual pressure to ignore options outside the two major
parties.
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If the purpose of RCV is to neutralize the spoiler effect in
multi-candidate elections, then the example set by Maine’s second district served
its purpose perfectly. After the initial round of voting, Republican Poliquin got
the most votes but failed to secure a majority. After the elimination of the two
independent candidates, their transfer votes pushed the Democrat Golden to a
majority. The votes for the independent candidates materially affected the
outcome of the race, demonstrating that the spoiler effect created by FPTP
distorted the preference of the electorate at-large. The outcome may not have
been to Poliquin’s advantage, but RCV succeeded on its own terms by correcting
for the inability of FPTP to produce a just result when more than two candidates
participate.
IV. ANALYSIS: WHY RANKED CHOICE, AND WHY WEST VIRGINIA
A. Democracy Demands Ranked Choice
The long-term trend of popular movements and societal adaptation to
changing economic conditions has been toward the democratization of American
political institutions. The structures instituted by the Constitution were intended
to insulate the higher echelons of government from popular opinion so that the
republican character of the state could be protected from the threat of democracy,
the founding generation’s particular bête noire. Successive generations
repudiated this intention. With the exception of the Jim Crow voter-suppression
measures passed at the turn of the century for the purpose of establishing
explicitly antidemocratic apartheid states throughout the South, partisan
gerrymandering intended to game geography in favor of one party over another,
and late measures in statehouses to erect bureaucratic barriers to the exercise of
the right to vote, the overwhelming historical trend has pointed toward
empowering the widest possible electorate to exert the most power possible in
directing government action.129
The popular project of the last two centuries has been to force the
Constitution—and liberalism in a more general sense—to live up to its promises.
The promotion of democratic control over government has been a key
component of this effort because the experience of an antimonarchical war for
independence, the peopling of the frontier shortly after the war, and the
Constitution’s own language all point inexorably toward democratic government
mediated through republican institutions.
The ordinary people of the United States shared neither the elite
education nor the upper-class status of the revolution’s political leadership and
would thus have understandably considered their war against the British to be a
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war against distant, unrepresentative, and unresponsive political institutions that
could not reasonably be replaced with a government intentionally insulated from
the people. Thus, a tradition of independence and self-government was born,
even if it would not be instantiated in the actual structure and operation of the
state for generations to come. Popular politics took over quickly enough,
however, as Andrew Jackson’s “Democracy” overturned the party system that
dominated the first decades of the country’s history.130
The dominance of the frontier in the self-image of Americans was
crucial as well in the development of the self-government ethos that informs this
democratic tradition. The first states to decline to impose serious restrictions on
the franchise for lack of property were the first two new states admitted into the
Union: Kentucky and Vermont.131 What those states shared in common is that
they were overwhelming rural, largely unsettled, and existed at the peripheries
of the United States where the influence of central government and institutions
of higher learning would be felt the least. The fact of these settlers’ lives is that
they governed themselves without deference to their supposed betters. The
democratic easing of access to the franchise was not just a matter of ideology but
a matter of practicality as well. These states and later territories needed migrants
to come and push the frontier further west, and the ability to vote was attractive
to many men without property who would not have been able to vote in the
eastern states. The implementation of strategic suffrage would later be repeated
in the Wyoming Territory in the passage of women’s suffrage for the purpose of
attracting female settlers in the overwhelmingly male territory.
Lastly, the Constitution famously opens with the invocation of “We the
People.”132 These words inaugurated a national self-conception for the United
States as a country not governed by a royal family or an aristocratic caste but by
the people residing within its borders. If the farmers, fur trappers, and enslaved
people were not literally in the room where the details of the document were
debated and hammered out, the Constitution’s drafters appeared by their words
to be speaking on their behalf. In the world of the late eighteenth century, it was
no small thing to identify the sovereignty of the country in its people rather than
a particular bloodline. While it is true that the framers of the Constitution sought
to create a government immune to undue popular pressure, the endeavors
nonetheless produced a founding document in which those farmers, fur trappers,
and enslaved people would see their own reflections. The virus of democracy
was encoded into the language of the Constitution and needed only to see the
document enacted for its release and dispersal throughout the body politic. The
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Constitution offered the people a participatory inch, and the people naturally
took a mile.
None of this to suggest that democracy is a favorable form of
government simply because it is the one that the United States has inherited after
more than two centuries of struggle and progress. These facts of American
history serve only to confirm that democracy has and almost certainly will
continue to be the way that Americans understand their relationship to
government. Democracy’s pressure on the governance of the United States
comes not out of left field but from below, from the masses of people who
comprise the electorate on whose instructions the state purports to act. It is not
therefore an imposition of some un-American, alien view of the way government
is supposed to function to suggest that elected public officials ought to serve at
the permission of the majority.
The key reform embodied in RCV speaks not simply to democracy but
to one of its central propositions: majority rule. Of all the modes of
decision-making tried and theorized over centuries of human civilization, it
would be a difficult task to uncover one that balances the interests of fairness to
all people with the necessity of practicality than democracy by majority rule. The
arguments for majoritarianism are threefold: (1) that the sovereign on whose
behalf state action occurs ought to decide what that state action should be;
(2) that the people at-large are the legitimate sovereign of a given jurisdiction,
not some smaller privileged class; and (3) that to reject something is as
expressive an act as to endorse.
The first argument is virtually a tautological expression of sovereignty;
it is as true under an autocratic monarchy as it is in a democratic republic. When
the state acts, it acts in the name of someone or of something. And while it may
be theoretically true that this would undergird any state expression of democracy,
the reality is that the people at-large fit this role more naturally than any
individual person or privileged subset of the populace. It satisfies theoretical
rigor to say that the sovereignty of France lay in its king and that the actions of
the French state were conducted in the name of the king, but France did not die
alongside its king. The French people continued speaking the French language,
reproducing French culture, and understanding themselves as French persons. In
reality, when an action is brought on a country’s behalf, it is brought on behalf
of a people without whom the country would not be.
The second argument asserts that the sovereignty of a state should
capture the widest possible swath of people in the interest of fairness and
security. Opponents of this notion might argue that the accidents of birth
naturally create a class of people preordained for leadership. They would,
however be wrong to make such an argument. The accidents of birth are just that:
accidents. Nobody has the opportunity to choose the talents they will receive
naturally from birth, and likewise nobody chooses the station, class, race, or sex
into which they are born. The aristocrat need understand as easily as he was born
into wealth, he could have just as easily been born into slavery. From that
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perspective, it is easy to understand that one’s station in life is often accepted but
rarely obtained by request, and that in order to account for the unfairness in the
randomness of birth the nobleman should not be privileged in his speech above
the common man. And as for security, the dilution of sovereignty into the masses
is a necessary bulwark against a tyrant who would imagine himself the human
embodiment of state sovereignty.
Thirdly, with the sovereignty of the people and the fairness of
democratic equality established, the democratic superiority of majority rule over
plurality rule follows logically. The conduct of democracy occurs in the act of
collective decision making, most efficiently through the practice of voting. A
vote records the opinion of the electorate on a particular issue, and because the
overwhelming size of the United States necessitates that deliberation occur
through chosen representatives, the particular issue in question is more often
about the selection of decision makers rather than resolving the substantive
decision itself. It is at this point that practical complications have frustrated the
full expression of democracy, but RCV fairly easily resolves the problem.
In a referendum on a particular question in which the options are
binary—yes or no—its acceptance and rejection are encoded automatically into
the options. Acceptance of one entails rejection of the other. The matter of
representation complicates this because by selecting one candidate out of many,
the voter is incapable of expressing their opinions on all the available options.
My vote for Candidate A at the expense of Candidate B and Candidate C cannot
signal that I actually quite liked Candidate C but hated Candidate B. The voter
appears simply to reject all but the selected candidate. A system that fails to
express the nuance of opinion in such cases fails to take into account the full
legitimacy of rejection as an opinion. In a three-way contest, the victor might fall
short of a majority and still win, and without RCV, there is no way to reckon
with the fact that a majority of the electorate in such a case did express a
judgment on the contest: that the victor was not the majority’s first choice.
Without reckoning with the semiotic nuance of a non-vote, representative
democracy cannot operate according to the will of the majority.
An opponent of the majority-rule principle might argue that majority
rule inevitably resolves into tyranny, risking the permanent oppression of the
minority by a well-disciplined majority. That person might argue that one need
only look to the Jim Crow South to know the terror a majority can enact on a
disempowered minority. This objection is not without legitimate concern, but it
misapprehends both the political dynamics of the Jim Crow South and the ability
of a legitimate democracy to self-immolate in the scenario described.
For one, the Jim Crow state governments of the South represented not
the danger of a democracy gone awry but the disaster that grows inevitable when
democracy is invalidated by an entrenched ruling class. The Jim Crow
governments established apartheid states through campaigns of racist terrorism;
accordingly, they represented not majority rule by a monolithic white class but
minority rule by a propertied elite committed to the suppression of democratic
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power through racist demagoguery. Blacks were prevented from meaningful
participation by force, and whites outside the ruling caste were prevented from
meaningful participation by elite design: to abolish democracy rather than rely
on an impoverished white underclass to sustain some racist imitation thereof.
Further, the exclusion of certain groups from the people frustrates
democracy’s bedrock principle of equality. The partisans for Jacksonian
Democracy understood that an egalitarian ethos had something to do with the
establishment and survival of a democracy, even if their racist myopia prevented
them from seeing the glaring contradiction between egalitarianism and the slave
society that thrived in antebellum America. Democracy entails certain
concomitant principles that, if violated, would invalidate the democratic
legitimacy of the body in question. Accordingly, Americans might have believed
that they were establishing and maintaining a democracy over the first century
and a half of the country’s history, but we know now—and those excluded on
account of race, sex, or class knew then—that it was incomplete. The failures are
incurable through democracy’s rollback. Only deeper democratization and
further enfranchisement can fix the deep contradictions in the practice of
democracy.
The case for RCV, accordingly, rests on the necessity of majority rule to
the functioning of a democratic society. It brings meaning and thrust to an
electorate decision to reject a particular option by requiring a majority for a
candidate to declare victory. To be chosen first by more than any other candidate
but to have been rejected by the majority would no longer pass democratic
muster. The first-round rejection of a candidate would function as a
retrospectively oriented demand that the candidate make herself as appealing as
possible to most of the electorate and not hide away in a loud minority electable
through a flaw in the system.
RCV’s advantage over FPTP is chiefly in the principle it advances,
which would align the electoral infrastructure of the United States with the
country’s historical drive toward more democratic and majoritarian institutions
since the nineteenth century. FPTP in combination with the two-party system
does tend to produce majoritarian results, but RCV would preserve the
majoritarian impulse while allowing for nonpartisan contests and proliferation
smaller parties that would otherwise be harmed by the “spoiler effect” promoted
by FPTP.
B. Ranked Choice Is Superior to Alternative Reforms
Opponents of RCV might argue that there are other ways to demand a
majority of voters approve of a victorious candidate than to ask them to rank
them on the ballot. They might point to those states that hold a second election
in the event that no candidate wins a majority and invite the top two finishers to
participate. While this technically achieves the theoretical demand for an elective
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majority, those states that hold later-date runoff elections frustrate majority rule
on more practical levels.
For one, runoff elections held at a later date suffer from depressed
turnout. Voters unfamiliar with the practice might not know at all that another
election would have to occur. Voters might also decide not to participate in the
runoff election because their preferred candidate finished outside the top-two. At
any rate, runoff elections happen with smaller electorates that are necessarily less
representative of the pool of eligible voters, not only absolutely, but even just in
comparison with the initial election. If one wants voters to express their full
opinions on all the candidates, it is best to have them do so all at once. Because
the RCV system asks less from the voter logistically, it could help fight the
significant turnout dips experienced in typical runoff elections.133
The second issue with the later-runoff solution is that in a massive multicandidate election, the practice of selecting the top two could ignore the
dominant trends within the electorate. For instance, in California, the top two
primary-election vote-getters regardless of party advance to the general election.
In a system like that, a district that would primarily vote Democrat could wind
up with two Republicans to choose from in the general election. Such an outcome
could easily result from a candidate field in which there are two Republicans but
maybe four Democrats. If the two Republicans split the conservative minority
evenly, their vote totals would outweigh any individual vote total among an
evenly split Democratic electorate. Such a system would only perpetuate the
bullying and hectoring already endemic to the FPTP system, in which candidates
are harassed into nonparticipation out of fear that their candidacy might swing
the election in favor of their least-favored candidate.
C. Ranked Choice and West Virginia
RCV would serve West Virginia’s electorate beyond its ordinary
advantages both by encouraging voters in the geographically diverse state to vote
for candidates outside their home region and by permitting nonpartisan judicial
elections to be conducted fairly.
As mentioned earlier, West Virginia’s elections can often be influenced
by voters’ intense identification with their home regions. West Virginia’s
geography varies significantly, from the Metro D.C. farmlands and bedroom
communities of the Eastern Panhandle to the rugged southern coalfields. As a
result, candidates can feel compelled to pander to the pride of one region over
another.
RCV would work to mitigate the effect of regional bias in deciding
elections. Under an RCV system, candidates would not just be campaigning for
133
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voters’ first-place votes, but their second-place votes as well. For that reason, a
candidate for the second congressional district from the Eastern Panhandle
would have to find some way to appeal to voters in the Kanawha Valley rather
than rely on the regional bias of their local supporters. On the flipside, voters
would be pushed to expand their horizons beyond their home regions as well and
cast their secondary votes to candidates from other parts of the state. As West
Virginia faces the prospect of losing one of its three congressional districts,134 its
remaining districts will only become more geographically diverse, further
heightening the need for RCV.
If West Virginia wants to conduct its highest judicial elections under the
reasonable premise of nonpartisanship, it is crucial that RCV be used to facilitate
these elections. West Virginia elects justices to its state supreme court for
12-year terms and holds these elections as statewide nonpartisan contests
concurrent with its primaries. A nonpartisan election—in which the number of
potential candidates is unlimited—put before a primary electorate is a recipe for
failing to obtain democratic legitimacy. And thus far this has proven true: no
justice elected under the nonpartisan system has won a majority of the vote. With
three seats on the court on the primary ballot in 2020, this pattern is almost
certain to repeat itself until the system is reformed.
V. CONCLUSION
The central case in favor of introducing RCV into West Virginia’s
electoral system addresses both a practical need and an undergirding
philosophical need: too many of West Virginia’s elections are resulting in
plurality victors and this phenomenon runs counter to the United States’.
post–Civil War trend toward a more democratic electoral system. In joining
Maine through the adoption of RCV, West Virginia could establish itself as an
innovative leader in the latest reform seeking to democratize representative
government.
The framers of the Constitution’s deep suspicion of popular power
meant that the establishment of democracy in America came not at the
conclusion of the American War of Independence, but rather gradually through
two intervening centuries of struggle and progress. The institution-dissolving
violence of the Civil War—called by some historians “the Second American
Revolution”—devastated the entrenched ruling class of the South and elevated
to positions of civic leadership people who had been enslaved just years earlier.
The war instilled new ideas of citizenship in the minds of Americans and inspired
a greater sense of ownership over one’s government among the common people
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of the country. At the beginning of the twentieth century, reformers reignited this
spirit of democratic entitlement by extending the franchise to women, instituting
primary elections, and amending the Constitution to provide for the direct
election of U.S. senators. In the wake of the midcentury Civil Rights Movement,
democracy was restored in the Southern states that had operated under apartheid
governments ever since Black Americans were terrorized into forced
disenfranchisement following the end of Reconstruction. While the Founders’
generation might have sought to keep government in the hands of an educated
elite, the predominant trend of the years since has been to expand the influence
of regular people on the affairs of state. In adopting RCV, West Virginia would
continue that trend.
RCV furthers democracy because it privileges majorities over
pluralities. The harm associated with plurality victors lies in the inherent
unpopularity of the winner: plurality winners have, by definition, been rejected
for a different candidate by the majority of voters. In many cases, the two may
be the same; there will be no reason to object when a first-round plurality winner
becomes a second-round majority winner in an RCV scenario. What makes the
difference is that RCV permits voters to express their most unencumbered
preference in selecting their representatives, without the latent limitations
imposed by the spoiler effect. Elections in which voters are forced to strategize
rather than vote their consciences promote gamesmanship over self-government.
Dysfunction results from legislatures populated by accidental representatives. In
the interest of democracy and toward the goal of electing governments that fully
reflect voters’ preferences, West Virginia must adopt RCV for its elections.
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